M. Tulli Ciceronis: Laelius De Amicitia

http://www.utexas.edu/depts/classics/documents/amicitia.html

26. Laelius: Vim hoc quidem est adferre.
Quid enim refert qua me ratione cogatis? cogitis certe.
Studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est, tum ne aequum quidem obsistere.

Laelius. Now you are really using force. It makes no difference what kind of force you use: force it is. For it is neither easy nor right to refuse a wish of my sons-in-law, particularly when the wish is a creditable one in itself.

Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet,
utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia,
ut dandis recipiendisque meritis quod quisque minus per se ipse posset,
id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet,
an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae,
sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa.

Well, then, it has very often occurred to me when thinking about friendship, that the chief point to be considered was this: is it weakness and want of means that make friendship desired? I mean, is its object an interchange of good offices, so that each may give that in which he is strong, and receive that in which he is weak? Or is it not rather true that, although this is an advantage naturally belonging to friendship, yet its original cause is quite other, prior in time, more noble in character, and springing more directly from our nature itself?

Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est,
princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam.

The Latin word for friendship - amicitia - is derived from that for love - amor; and love is certainly the prime mover in contracting mutual affection.

Nam utilitates quidem etiam ab iis percipiuntur saepe qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et observantur temporis causa,

For as to material advantages, it often happens that those are obtained even by men who are courted by a mere show of friendship and treated with respect from interested motives.

in amicitia autem nihil fictum est,
nihil simulatum et, quidquid est, id est verum et voluntarium.

But friendship by its nature admits of no feigning, no pretence: as far as it goes it is both genuine and spontaneous.

27. Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia,
applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura.

Therefore I gather that friendship springs from a natural impulse rather than a wish for help: from an inclination of the heart, combined with a certain instinctive feeling of love, rather than from a deliberate calculation of the material advantage it was likely to confer.

Quod quidem quale sit, etiam in bestiis quibusdam animadverti potest,
quae ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus et ab eis ita amantur ut facile earum sensus appareat.

The strength of this feeling you may notice in certain animals. They show such love to their offspring for a certain period, and are so beloved by them, that they clearly have a share in this natural, instinctive affection.

Quod in homine multo est evidentius, primum ex ea caritate quae est inter natos et parentes,
quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere non potest;

But of course it is more evident in the case of man: first, in the natural affection between children and their parents, an affection which only shocking wickedness can sunder:

deinde cum similis sensus exstitit amoris,
si aliquem nacti sumus cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus,

quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspicere videamur.

and next, when the passion of love has attained to a like strength - on our finding, that is, some one person with whose character and nature we are in full sympathy, because we think that we perceive in him what I may call the beacon-light of virtue.

28. Nihil est enim virtute amabilius,
nihil quod magis adliciat ad diligendum,
quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem etiam eos,
quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus.

For nothing inspires love, nothing conciliates affection, like virtue. Why, in a certain sense we may be said to feel affection even for men we have never seen, owing to their honesty and virtue.

Cicero: 
On Friendship, or Laelius

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/cicero-friendship.html